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In its communication on a ‘European Green 
Deal’ in December 2019, the European 
Commission highlighted the importance of 
conducting the transition to a zero-carbon society 
in a ‘fair and inclusive way’.1 To this end, it 
released its proposal for a Just Transition 
Mechanism on 14 January 2020. Since, the 
proposal has been sparked a sensitive debate 
about what a just transition is, and how it should 
come about. A plan for a Just Transition is a 
necessary step to generate buy-in from members 
of the public and from regions that will be most  
economically affected by the transition to a zero-
carbon society. However, the plan put forward by 
the Commission has since become one of the 
most contentious parts of the EU’s Green Deal. 
This Policy Brief highlights and addresses three 
challenges facing the Just Transition Mechanism. 
If the EU can manage to overcome the strong 
focus on national allocations; broaden the just 
transition from the energy sector to other 
industries; and include the private sector and 
societal actors in the transition, then it may be 
effective and acceptable. Ultimately, tackling 
these challenges means mainstreaming the just 
transition and integrating it throughout all 
streams of climate and social policy. 
THE EU’S JUST TRANSITION MECHANISM                                                                   
The idea of a just transition is not new and has 
been steadily emerging as a vital part of the 
transition to a zero-carbon economy. A 2015 
International Labour Organisation publication 
lays out the principles and guidelines for a just 
transition,2 and the concept had been employed 
by civil society long before this. Just Transition 
measures aim to help those whose jobs and 
livelihoods are most affected by the shift. The 
EU’s proposal, however, is a very specific version 
The EU’s ‘Just Transition Mechanism’ 
proposal has become highly contentious, 
bringing up issues of redistribution between 
countries. It faces three main challenges: 
overcoming a focus on national allocations; 
expanding the transition from energy to 
other sectors; and including the private 
sector and civil society in the transition. By 
effectively mainstreaming the idea of a just 
transition, the Commission can ensure that 
the current proposal not only becomes less 
sensitive, but also more effectively supports 
a fair shift to a zero-carbon society. 
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of this idea, with a precise focus on the financing 
of the transition – not least because of its origins 
as a bargaining chip to get more carbon-
dependent member states on board with the 
Green Deal. It is therefore worth outlining the 
Just Transition Mechanism in more detail. 
In its proposal for the JTF,3 the European 
Commission defines the Just Transition as a key 
aspect to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 ‘in an 
effective and fair manner’, ‘leav[ing] no-one 
behind’. The Just Transition Mechanism has 
three targets: people and citizens most vulnerable 
to the transition; companies and sectors active in 
carbon-intensive industries; and Member States 
and regions that are dependent on fossil fuels and 
carbon-intensive industries. It foresees 
mobilising at least €100 billion through a 
combination of public and private investments 
from 2021-2027. The mechanism will also be 
supported by existing just transition measures 
such as the existing Modernisation Fund, which 
is financed through the Emissions Trading 
Scheme and supports the modernisation of 
energy systems in 10 member states. 
The proposed Just Transition Mechanism is 
made up of three financing pillars: 
1. The first pillar is the main subject of 
discussion: the Just Transition Fund, 
which will draw around €30-50 billion 
from the EU’s cohesion funds, but will 
also include €7.5 billion of ‘fresh money’ 
and national co-financing. This pillar will 
provide mostly grants for territorially-
based projects. 
2. InvestEU’s Just Transition Scheme, 
which aims to mobilise up to €45 billion 
in private investments. 
3. A public sector loan facility with the 
European Investment Bank, backed by 
the EU budget, mobilising up to €25-30 
billion in public investments. 
Of course, it must be kept in mind that the 
amount of funding allocated to the Mechanism 
depends on the outcome of the ongoing 
negotiations of the Multiannual Financial 
Framework from 2021-2027. 
In order to receive grants from the JTF, each 
Member State will need to provide Territorial Just 
Transition Plans to the Commission, outlining 
which regions it would like support for and a clear 
timeline for the transition. Eligibility will be based 
on criteria that include the percentage of 
production in the territory based in fossil fuel 
intensive sectors (although these criteria must still 
be discussed by the European Parliament). In 
contrast, the second and third pillars can be used 
for investments that take place outside these most 
affected regions, but only if the projects benefit 
and are key to the transition in those most 
affected territories. 
The redistributive nature of much of the JTF – 
and the fact that it taps into existing financing, 
like the Cohesion Funds, means that this has 
become a sensitive issue among member states. 
While it is utopian to believe that such a policy 
could ever pass without controversy, there are at 
least three main challenges that the EU should 
tackle in order to achieve an acceptable and 
effective just transition. 
CHALLENGE 1: OVERCOMING THE FOCUS 
ON NATIONAL ALLOCATIONS                                                           
The current debate within the EU has been 
overwhelmingly focused on the first pillar of the 
Just Transition Mechanism – the Just Transition 
Fund. This is for two main reasons: the JTF is – 
so far – the most concrete element of the Just 
Transition Mechanism proposal and has come 
directly onto the agenda, as it will have to be 
negotiated as part of the ongoing discussions on 
the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial framework. 
Moreover, given that the second and third pillars 
of the Just Transition Mechanism are market-
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based, it is impossible to give more than forecasted 
amounts (rather than specific country allocations). 
The JTF has therefore been the most salient and 
debated aspect of the Just Transition Mechanism 
to date. 
Yet, the JTF is also the most sensitive part of the 
proposal, as touched upon above. It proposes to 
draw from the EU’s cohesion funds (namely the 
European Social Fund+ and the European 
Regional Development Fund), which fuel 
existing divisions between (groups) of countries. 
It will also require the transfer of current 
cohesion funds from certain regions to others, 
meaning that, like with any redistributive policy, 
some countries and regions will ‘lose out’. There 
are, finally, some fears that the focus on funding 
detracts from the strategic planning aspect of the 
mechanism, although the requirement for clear 
and concrete territorial plans is supposed to 
combat this. 
It is, of course, impossible to ensure a just 
transition without at least some form of territorial 
allocation scheme, given the need to ‘cushion’ the 
effects of the transition to a zero-carbon society 
and economy in the regions that will be most 
affected – those dependent on fossil-fuel 
intensive industries. However, one potential path 
for the EU to win over sceptical countries and 
regions is to emphasise the potential of the 
second and third pillars of the mechanism. The 
Invest EU pillar, for example, allows for work on 
projects that are interregional but may also 
benefit most affected regions (for instance, 
training schemes, mobility networks, etc.). 
Similarly, changes in the rules for state aid as part 
of the Just Transition Mechanism may allow 
countries to support and develop new green 
industry sectors, such as renewable energy. 
Although the effectiveness of these market-based 
instruments as a “bargaining chip” is somewhat 
reduced with their lack of predictability, trying to 
divert attention from the zero-sum aspect of the 
Just Transition Mechanism to the positive-sum 
investment potential of the other pillars may help 
to make the proposal more palatable for 
countries that receive little to no financing from 
the JTF itself. 
CHALLENGE 2: MOVING BEYOND ENERGY 
PRODUCTION 
A just transition is not only about energy 
production and more obvious carbon-intensive 
industries, but also about systemic change that 
will be necessary in many sectors and that will 
affect workers, consumers and citizens. While the 
European Commission’s proposal does refer to 
this need to support citizens and workers in 
different industries, the actual content of the Just 
Transition Mechanism is largely focused on 
energy production. This not only conceals a large 
part of the work that is necessary to implement a 
Just Transition, but may also heighten a sense of 
unfairness if countries see the JTF as ‘rewarding’ 
countries that have been reluctant to switch from 
carbon-intensive energy production, or as a 
transfer of funds from countries that have already 
taken steps to decarbonise and those that have 
not yet begun. 
Other key sectors will also be important for a just 
transition: measures necessary to achieve climate 
neutrality by 2050 will have an impact on the lives 
of workers and citizens alike. Transport, for 
instance, is a key sector where significant change 
will be required in the transition to carbon 
neutrality, as individual vehicles running on fossil 
fuels will need to be replaced with electric 
vehicles and alternative means of transport. 
These measures will not only affect workers in 
the car industry, but also consumers. Emmanuel 
Macron’s attempt to tax diesel and the resulting 
gilets jaunes movement highlight the importance of 
ensuring that any changes to this end will need to 
avoid measures that predominantly affect the 
lower-income households – for instance, a simple 
tax on fuel or fossil fuel-burning cars. They 
should also include the provision of alternative 
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means of transport: public transport, carsharing 
and bicycles. Currently, this sort of project would 
only currently be supported through the Just 
Transition Mechanism if it relates directly to the 
regions identified in the Territorial Just 
Transition Plan. 
Similarly, construction and renovation have been 
highlighted as priorities for the EU, with a 
‘Renovation Wave’ plan expected to be published 
later this year. Residential heating makes up an 
important percentage of emissions in the majority 
of EU countries, with around 17% of all EU 
emissions coming from residential heating.4  Both 
ensuring that new buildings are energy efficient 
and retrofitting old buildings will be a necessity 
to achieve carbon neutrality. This renovation is 
also a key part of the just transition, particularly 
to combat energy poverty. While renewables 
should not cost more than fossil fuels in the near 
future, the fact that in many EU countries heating 
oil and fossil fuels are subsidised for private use, 
particularly for social reasons, means that initially 
at least, a shift to renewables will either cost 
citizens, or require state subsidies. Renovation, 
while requiring a significant upfront cost, is an 
overall cheaper – and more efficient – way to 
combat energy poverty and reduce energy costs 
for all users. 
A first step that will be vital for all EU states will 
be to identify the sectors and industries that will 
be most affected by the transition to a zero-
carbon economy – studies that could even be 
funded by the JTF itself. While this data has been 
collected in some countries, the majority have not 
done full impact assessments or forecasts of 
priority areas. Any measures that follow must be 
implemented following the principles of 
subsidiarity, implying that not all funds 
necessarily need to come from the JTF. However, 
project-based funding in a manner similar to the 
existing Cohesion Funds – whereby the EU 
provides funding for locally-managed projects in 
regions that would otherwise lack means – may 
be key to ensuring both subsidiarity and good 
management, while showing EU support for this 
agenda. The Just Transition Mechanism could be 
adapted to provide support for these key 
industries and sectors, for instance by reserving a 
certain percentage of the funds for consumers, 
citizens and other sectors. 
CHALLENGE 3: WORKING WITH THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR AND STAKEHOLDERS 
The EU’s proposed Just Transition Mechanism is 
reasonably quiet about the role that it envisages 
for the private sector and social stakeholders in 
the transition, despite the fact that the 
implementation of projects and the success of 
any transition will ultimately depend on these 
stakeholders. 
Companies are key in the re-education and 
training of workers during the transition, across 
all industries that will undergo serious 
restructuring. Previous research has already 
indicated that re-education and training schemes 
tend to be vaguer and less effective when there is 
no existing regulation or public policy in place. 
State regulation is thus ‘not only an important 
driver for greening, but also for skills 
development and training provision’.5 By 
ensuring that concrete regulations exist at 
national and EU level (for example, setting 
targets for transitioning industries, or clear 
timelines for the phase-out of fossil fuels) 
governments provide certainty and a framework 
within which companies can define and develop 
retraining schemes. At the same time, it is 
important to keep in mind the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle while designing mechanisms for a just 
transition: while public funding is important, it is 
not used efficiently when used to subsidise or 
resolve the results of negative externalities of 
companies’ activities. Funding for re-education 
schemes should thus be carefully monitored to 
ensure that it is not used, for example, for 
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cleaning or rehabilitation of industrial areas or 
polluted regions. 
During this transition and when designing 
schemes and programmes, social actors must also 
be included, including trade unions and 
representative civil society organisations. The 
extent to which the inclusion of civil society will 
be an obligation is currently unclear from the Just 
Transition proposal, even though this is a guiding 
principle of the ILO’s guidelines for a just 
transition., Representation from different parts 
of society is vital to include the often-overlooked 
impact of measures on consumers and citizens. 
The EU needs to include specific measures 
requiring countries – and the EU itself – to 
include the private sector and civil society in 
policymaking for all measures. 
This is not necessarily an issue at the level of EU 
policymaking: the Commission has ensured that 
citizens and stakeholder groups are included 
through public consultations on different aspects 
of the Green Deal – notably through its 
European Climate Pact, expected to be launched 
ahead of the UN climate conference in Glasgow 
in November 2020.6 However, the lack of 
measures requiring the consultation and inclusion 
of stakeholders at national and sub-national level 
in the Just Transition Mechanism – particularly 
given the different attitudes and levels of 
inclusion in different member states – is more 
worrying. Additional measures should therefore 
be considered to require the inclusion of 
stakeholders not only in the drafting of the 
Territorial Just Transition Plans, but also in the 
implementation and governance of the projects 
and measures that are funded. 
CONCLUSION: MAINSTREAMING THE JUST 
TRANSITION 
These three challenges – overcoming the focus 
on national allocations, moving beyond the 
energy sector alone, and working with the private 
sector and stakeholders – are important not only 
for the EU to reduce the sensitivity of the 
proposed Just Transition Mechanism, but also to 
ensure that the transition to a zero-carbon society 
is a just one across all parts of society. 
Of course, many of the proposed measures have 
been – or will be – taken through different 
policies. For example, as highlighted above, 
measures on construction and renovation are 
planned for later this year. Similarly, measures 
that do contribute to a just transition are already 
being funded through structural and investment 
funds – despite the fact that the design of the Just 
Transition Mechanism as a separate mechanism, 
and the salience of the JTF within this, make it 
seem like these are the only policies that support 
a just transition. 
To better ‘sell’ the proposal, the EU can work to 
mainstream the idea of a ‘just transition’ 
throughout all policy actions taken under the 
Green Deal. This would take all of the 
recommendations above into account, by 
ensuring that the just transition is an idea that cuts 
to the core of all action on climate change, rather 
than being concentrated in one policy proposal, 
sector and type of funding. This would not only 
help to reduce the sensitivity of the proposal, but 
also ensure that the transition to climate 
neutrality benefits citizens, consumers and 
workers throughout the EU. 
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